***The Fourth Taiwan Metaphysics Colloquium* (*TMC-IV 2020*)**

8 -10 January, 2020

Place: Room 302, Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University

***Keynote speech* (I)**

**Professor Hartry Field, FAAAS**

Silver Professor, New York University

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**Title:** *The objectivity of mathematics*

***Abstract***

There are two somewhat separable issues surrounding “platonism”: the existence of mathematical objects, and mathematical objectivity. After reviewing how a certain kind of no-mathematical-objects view leads to non-objectivity in math, and considering an argument that non-objectivity makes no sense if there are mathematical objects, I’ll consider one attempt to concede the objects while denying the objectivity: a kind of conventionalism. I’ll then consider arguments (1) that conventionalism makes no sense for arithmetic (because it needs to assume the consistency of conventions, which is essentially an arithmetic notion), and (2) that once one concedes objectivity in arithmetic there is little motivation not to extend it to much or all of set theory.

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***Keynote speech* (II)**

**Professor Daniel Stoljar, FAHA**

Director of the Centre for Consciousness, Centre for Consciousness

Professor of Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Science (RSSS)

ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University

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**Title**:*Structuralism and the Problem of Consciousness*

***Abstract***

Structuralist approaches to physical properties have played a big role in philosophical discussions of consciousness in recent years, mainly through the development of what has come to be called "Russellian monism"—an approach in philosophy of mind that is exciting because of its promise to move us beyond the dualist-physicalist standoff. In the first part of this talk, I will set out Russellian monism, explaining its differences and similarities to various nearby views. In the second part, I will raise some questions about what a structuralist approach to physical properties could amount to in the context of debates about consciousness.

**Professor Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra** (Invited speaker)

Professor of Metaphysics,

Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Oriel College, Oxford University

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**Title**: *An argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles*

***Abstract***

In this paper I will argue for what I take it to be an interesting, non-trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and I will present an argument for it.

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**Ralf M. Bader** (Invited speaker)

Fellow and Tutor in philosophy, Merton College, Oxford University

Associate Professor, the Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University

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**Title**: *Meta-ethical robustness*

***Abstract***

This paper distinguishes and characterises two levels of good-making: the level of good-makers (the features of the value bearers in virtue of which they are valuable) and the level of makers of good-makers (the things that make it the case that certain features are good-makers). It then employs this distinction to develop an account of meta-ethical robustness, distinguishing robust (objective) from non-robust (subjective) normative phenomena.

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Mary Leng (Invited speaker)

Senior Lecturer

Department of Philosophy

University of York, UK

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**Title**: The Prim and the Prime: Putnam, Thick Concepts, and the Collapse of the Mathematical/Physical Dichotomy'

***Abstract***

Just what is the ‘indispensability argument’ in the philosophy of mathematics an argument for? In contemporary philosophy of mathematics, it is widely assumed that this argument (usually presented as ‘the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument’) is an argument for mathematical Platonism, the view that our mathematical theories consist of bodies of truth about acausal mind- and language-independent abstract objects (such as numbers, functions, and sets). However, Hilary Putnam himself claimed that his indispensability argument was only ever intended to be an argument for “the objectivity of mathematics in a realist sense”, and not for the existence of mathematical objects. But just what is involved in the claim that mathematics is objective that distinguishes Putnam’s view from the nominalist positions that he claims to reject, which ground the objectivity of mathematical fictionality in the objectivity of logical consequence? To make sense of Putnam’s claim to be defending a genuinely realist, though not Platonist, picture of mathematics, I argue that we must look to Putnam’s metaethical views, and in particular to the emphasis placed there on the collapse of the fact/value dichotomy. Putnam’s indispensability considerations point to an analogous collapse of the mathematical/physical dichotomy, and to a logical space in the philosophy of mathematics for a realist understanding of the essential role of mathematical concepts modeled on realist positions in metaethics that point to the objectivity of evaluative concepts. A consequence of recognizing this Putnamian position is that it draws a new line between so-called ‘easy road’ and ‘hard road’ versions of fictionalism. While Field’s hard road fictionalism counts as anti-realist anti-Platonism, arguably easy road fictionalism offers just the combination of mathematical realism with anti-Platonism that Putnam claimed to be arguing for all along

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**Expressivism Panel**

Simon Goldstein (Organizer)

Senior Research Fellow

Dianoia Institute of Philosophy

Australian Catholic University (ACU), Melbourne

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**Title**: *Credence for epistemic expressivists*

***Abstract***

Triviality results raise problems for plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.

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Paolo Santorio

Associate Professor

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**Title**: *Expressivism and Indeterminacy*
***Abstract***

The debate on expressivism about epistemic modality and the debate about indeterminacy have so far proceeded on separate tracks. In particular, the metasemantic picture that is usually associated to modal expressivism is very different from metasemantic and metaphysical views about the nature of indeterminacy. At the same time, there are striking formal connections between the two debates. Expressivist logics for epistemic "must" in the style of Veltman and Yalcin are analogous to standard logics for the determinacy operator. Moreover, analogous triviality results can be proven for epistemic modals and for languages involving a determinacy operator. In the talk, I will investigate whether these formal analogies may lead to reconsider some of the received views about the nature of modal content and of indeterminacy.

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Nate Charlow

Associate Professor

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**Title**: *Degreed Belief, In General*

***Abstract***

Credences of a certain type may be understood as probabilities: subjective estimates of objective chance of the truth of a proposition about the world -- a worldly representation. Credences that are not of this type are not, however, to be understood as probabilities (when a subject’s credence cannot be understood as their estimate of objective chance of the truth of a worldly representation). How, then, are they to be understood? This talk attempts to describe an answer.